Brian Baird on the hot seat: "Assessing Organizing for America through the health care lens"

Chris Cillizza:

A few weeks back, we wrote that Organizing for America -- the operation built in the wake of the 2008 campaign to push President Obama's legislative agenda -- faced a serious test of its efficacy as it pushed hard for passage of the health care bill.

In the immediate aftermath of Sunday night's vote, OFA claimed a sweeping victory (and a validation of its mission), noting that they had produced hundreds of thousands of phone calls -- among other voter contacts -- to fence-sitting members in the week prior to the vote.

Their work, in turn, drew praise from several people who have followed the organization very closely.

Ben Smith of Politico headlined a post "Credit to OFA" and concluded that in the "legislative trench warfare that has defined this year, [Obama's] campaign organization was a serious asset."

Ari Melber of the liberal Nation magazine, who has studied OFA (and its effectiveness) closely, offered this take:

"In the homestretch...the numbers and coverage suggest that OFA was able to channel grassroots support for the bill in effective and even confrontational ways."

If OFA's success or failure as an organization is entirely hinged on the fate of the health care bill passing, then it's tough to draw any other conclusion than the Sunday vote was a rousing victory for the organization.

The truth, however, of OFA's efficacy in regards the health care vote is far more nuanced and more difficult to accurately assess.

OFA's mission statement is simple: rally Obama's base -- and the more than 13 million email addresses its possesses -- to persuade and/or cajole members of Congress on the president's legislative priorities. And, assessing persuasion is a complicated game that is as much about human nature as it is about politics.

Take Washington Rep. Brian Baird (D) who voted "no" on the health care bill back in November.

Baird, who announced his retirement in early December, was publicly wavering in advance of this vote. In a memo outlining OFA's effectiveness sent to to reporters this morning, Democratic National Committee communications director Brad Woodhouse noted that Baird "said that the number of calls he received from inside his district in support of reform was persuasive in moving him" from "no" to "yes"; Woodhouse added that OFA was directly responsible for nearly three-quarters of all calls to Baird's office in support of the health care bill.

Compare that claim with Baird's quotes in a Roll Call story detailing the effort to win his vote.

Said Baird:

"Everybody knew in my case -- no point in cajoling me, They were likely to get punched in the mouth if they said, 'You're not running,'. You say that to me, you insult me personally, because it implies all I care about is election."

The story goes on to note that as Baird made up his mind he had a private sitdown with President Obama as well as conversations with Vice President Joe Biden and Commerce Secretary Gary Locke (Wash.). He even went over the plan "point by point" with Office of Management and Budget Director Peter Orzag.

What then made up Baird's mind? Was it OFA's calls? Or the conversations with top Administration officials and members of the Democratic leadership in the House?

It's impossible to know and it's almost certain that no one thing did the trick.

(In truth, Organizing for America is likely to get less credit than it deserves in some circles because individual Members of Congress are often loathe to credit a persuasion campaign as the reason that their vote changed. The typical stated reason is generally far more high minded citing a detailed analysis of the bill after which they decided it was the right thing for the country.)

But the Baird back-and-forth gets at the fundamental chicken and egg-ness of OFA. We could argue until we are blue in the face as to whether insist that Baird was swayed primarily by calls from OFA or conversations with the President and his aides without coming to any real resolution.

The best (only?) conclusion we are left with is that, at a minimum, OFA helped around the edges to rally support for the vote. If the choice is between scads of calls in support of passing the bill into wavering Members' districts and no calls at all, it's hard to argue against those calls and the work OFA did.